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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT TAX OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT 
DISCHARGED UNTIL PAID. 
Tax obligations are not discharged until paid and the vehicle 
to collect tax obligations originally omitted is the escaped 
property statute. Its purpose is to allow for the correction of 
the omission of taxing officers in previous years. "No statute of 
limitations runs against the state, and it is a matter of 
discretion with it to determine how far into the past it will reach 
to compel performance of a taxpayer's obligation. The owner of 
taxable property omitted from the tax rolls becomes liable for the 
1 
tax thereon at the time the property ought to have been placed upon 
the rolls, and this liability continues until the tax is discharged 
by payment. The completion of the tax roll for a given year 
creates no vested right in the owners of property subject to 
taxation that the assessment shall not thereafter be modified or 
amended to their detriment. The legislature may constitutionally 
provide for the assessment of previously omitted property as well 
as for the revaluation of property previously assessed." State and 
Local Taxation, 72 Am Jur.2d §788 (citations omitted). 
The purpose of the escaped property statute as noted above 
must be viewed against the backdrop of public policy and the 
necessity for the collection of tax revenue. In Robinson v. 
Hansen, 282 P. 782 (Utah 1929), this policy and interest were 
articulated as follows: 
It is a recognized principle of law that taxes 
for general government purposes, lawfully 
imposed by the state, are paramount to all 
other demands against the taxpayer, although 
the statute imposing the tax does not 
expressly declare such priority. This rule 
rests upon public policy and necessity. Civil 
government cannot exist or be maintained 
without revenues, and taxes levied by the 
state for its support are founded upon a 
higher obligation than other demands. It is 
essential to the dignity and power of the 
sovereign state that taxes levied by it be 
promptly collected without fail. 
Id., 282 P. at 783 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Appellee posits the general 
rule that the County cannot retroactively collect additional taxes. 
The first case it cites is Crystal Car Line v. State Tax 
Commission, 174 P.2d 984, 987 (Utah 1946). The issue was whether 
it was proper to assess railroad cars as personal property and to 
enforce collection through seizure and sale of the property as 
provided under the laws then in effect. The case has no 
application to escaped assessments or unlawfully received tax 
exemptions. 
The second case relied on is County Board of Equalization v. 
State Tax Commission, ex.rel. Sunkist Service Co., 789 P.2d 291, 
293 (Utah 1990), for the general rule that "where a valid 
assessment has been made by an assessor cognizant of the facts, 
undervaluation is ordinarily not a ground for another assessment." 
This rule actually proves Appellants' point. Since a valid 
assessment was not made when Appellee's commercial property 
received a residential exemption Sunkist allows collection as an 
escaped assessment. The assessor was not aware of the error in 
assessment until 1990. 
Finally, First Security unashamedly admits it is not entitled 
to a residential exemption but it is nevertheless entitled to a tax 
refund for the mistakenly received exemption. The rule which First 
Security urges this Court to adopt is "when such an exemption was 
applied to the property through no fault of the taxpayer, and the 
assessed taxes were paid, the County is precluded from going back 
in later years to collect additional money." Appellee's Brief, 
p.9. If adopted, this rule would extend beyond assessment errors 
related to exemptions. It effectively would mean that once the tax 
is paid, any assessment error which is to the taxpayer's benefit 
cannot be collected as an escaped assessment. 
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To adopt this rule of law, would require the Court to overrule 
Sunkist and would effectively eviscerate the escaped property 
statute. 
Finally, the parties each contend that the rules of statutory 
construction favor it. The County contends that since Appellee is 
essentially seeking a property tax exemption it should first show 
its entitlement and the escaped property statute should be 
construed against the taxpayer seeking an exemption from taxation. 
The Appellee takes the opposite stance and cites County Board of 
Equalization v. Nupetco Associates. 119 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1989), 
quoting from Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 450 P.2d 
97, 99 (Utah 1969), to support is position. In Cockayne the Court 
upheld an escaped assessment totalling $3,141.52 against a 
corporation even though $269.26 in taxes had originally been 
assessed against the corporation's president and had been paid. 
While arguing the escaped property statute must be construed 
favorably to the taxpayer, Appellee quotes only a portion of the 
Cockayne decision and omits the language construing the escaped 
property statute favorably to the taxing entity. The full text is 
as follows: 
We have made the observations in this opinion 
and have arrived at our conclusion in 
awareness that statutes imposing taxes and 
prescribing tax procedures should generally be 
construed favorably to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority. Such 
rules, though salutary in proper 
circumstances, should not be so applied as to 
defeat or obstruct the correct operation and 
the application of taxing procedures. The 
payment of taxes is burdensome. But the means 
of relief is not to be found in allowing some 
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taxpayers to slip by without paying their fair 
share and thus putting an even greater burden 
on others. 
As in Cockavne, the Court should not construe the escaped 
property statute so as to let First Security slip by without paying 
its fair share and putting an even greater burden on other 
taxpayers. 
POINT II 
THE PROPERTY ESCAPED ASSESSMENT. 
Appellee's next argument is that the escaped property 
statute enacted in 1989 with an effective date of January 1, 1990, 
should apply retroactively to 1985 as opposed to the escaped 
property statute in effect during the years the property actually 
escaped assessment. The County utilized the statute in effect for 
the years subject to assessment i.e. 1985 through 1988. In doing 
so, the County acted consistently since it used the tax rates in 
effect for those years as opposed to the 1990 tax rates. 
Retroactive legislation are "acts which operate on 
transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which 
existed before passage of the act." Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction, Sands 4th Ed., Vol. 2, §41.01. Retroactive 
legislation is generally disfavored and is not to be construed as 
retroactive unless the legislature expressly provides for it. 
Retrospective operation is not favored by the 
Courts, however, and a law will not be 
construed as retroactive unless the act 
clearly, by express language or necessary 
implication, indicates the legislature 
intended a retroactive application. 
Id., §41.04 at 348. 
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In this instance the escaped property statute expressly 
provided the effective date of the act as January 1, 1990. Other 
evidence it was not intended to apply retroactively is that the 
version of §59-2-309 which became effective on January 1, 1990, did 
not repeal the escaped property statute (§59-2-309) in effect prior 
thereto. "Failure of an act to repeal a prior statutory provision 
on the same subject is evidence of a legislative purpose that the 
new act not apply retroactively," Id.. §41.04 at 350. 
Finally, it is fair to Appellee to apply the 1989 version of 
the escaped property statute since it would have undoubtedly 
applied if the assessment error had been noticed and asserted in 
1989 as opposed to one year later. 
The County has drawn the Court's attention to the case of 
General Dynamics Corp. v. County of San Diego, 166 Cal. Rptr. 310 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) for the general rule that "an escaped 
assessment is levied according to the laws existing in the fiscal 
year in which the under-assessment occurred," Id., at 314. 
Appellee asserts the County "misread" the case but then admits the 
Court refused to apply a law which became effective in 1974 to an 
escaped assessment made in 1974 for tax year 1972. It applied the 
law in effect in 1972. Instead of distinguishing the case the 
Appellee's argument illustrates the factual and legal similarity 
between General Dynamics and this matter. Further, the County 
relied on General Dynamics as authority for the rule that the 
constitutional requirements of uniformity and equality in 
assessments provide authority to collect the tax if the escaped 
property statute does not. 
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There is no Utah Supreme Court case on point, i.e. whether a 
mistakenly applied exemption can be collected as an escaped 
assessment. However, Appellee argues that even if the 1990 version 
of the escaped property statute does not apply, under the law as 
decided in the case of County Board of Equalization v. Nupetco 
Associates, 779 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1989), the property is not subject 
to escaped assessment. The language of the Court is instructive in 
determining whether property has escaped assessment or is merely 
undervalued. It stated as follows: 
The mistake in the acreage figure 
resulted in an undervaluation of the 
assessed property, not in an escape from 
assessment within the meaning of the 
statute. The property was assessed, 
albeit inaccurately. The statute does 
not permit retroactive correction of 
mistaken valuations after the tax has 
been paid. 
Id., 779 P.2d at 1139. 
From Nupetco and Sunkist two rules emerge. First, if 
property is undervalued the escaped assessment statute can not be 
used to alter the valuation. Secondly, improvements which are 
completely omitted from assessment can be assessed retroactively as 
an escaped assessment. Neither of these cases are directly on 
point. The property wasn't undervalued because the full market 
value is reflected on the tax notice and the improvements have not 
been omitted or even under assessed. 
Since neither of the foregoing cases address this factual 
situation, neither would be overruled if this Court finds in favor 
of Appellants. Because Utah hasn't decided this issue, Appellants 
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have cited decisions from other jurisdictions which upheld the use 
of escaped assessment statutes to collect a tax attributable to an 
improperly received exemption. 
Appellees attempt to distinguish the cases cited by the County 
ignores certain underlying premises of each. Like the matter 
before this Court, Freiahtliner Corp. v. Department of Revenue. 549 
P.2d 662 (Ore. 1976) and Cherry Hill Industrial Properties v. 
Township of Voorhees. 452 A.2d 673 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dir. 1982) 
addressed whether escaped or omitted property statutes could be 
used to collect additional taxes due to a mistakenly allowed 
property tax exemption. 
Both Freiahtliner and Cherry Hill held that property which is 
not legally entitled to a tax exemption, is subject to retroactive 
collection of the tax attributable to the exemption. Appellee 
considers Freiahtliner distinguishable because Oregon/s omitted 
property statute recognized that property which has been omitted in 
part may be assessed as an escaped assessment. An argument can be 
made that Appellee's property was wholly omitted because it was 
assessed as residential property instead of as commercial property. 
In other words, a mistaken residential exemption doesn't constitute 
a partial omission of assessment but rather a complete omission of 
assessment of the property's status under law. 
Also, Appellee attempts to distinguish Cherry Hill Industrial 
Properties primarily on the grounds the taxpayer failed to file 
required forms to qualify for the exemption and hence under Utah's 
1990 version of the escaped property statute the property would be 
subject to retroactive tax collection. Nothing in Cherry Hill 
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suggests that New Jersey had such a provision so as to allow for 
the escaped assessment. In fact, the very argument asserted by 
Appellee that property can't be subject to escaped assessment 
unless it is wholly omitted was rejected by the Court. In both 
General Dynamics and Cherry Hill Indus. Properties the Court held 
that exemptions which resulted in underassessment could be 
withdrawn and retroactively assessed. 
Also, Sunkist doesn't stand for the broad proposition Appellee 
asserts, i.e. that underassessed property can't be subject to 
escaped assessment since the Court's reference to underassessment 
was dicta. This is apparent from Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt 
Lake County. 799 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1990), decided in pari materia 
with Sunkist. The County argued it could assert an escaped 
assessment against Kennecott's property because the method for 
valuing the property resulted in an unconstitutional 
underassessment. Although not deciding the issue because the facts 
were not before it, the Court's statement is instructive in the 
proper interpretation of Sunkist: 
To justify a reassessment under §59-5-17, the 
County must be able to show that unassessed or 
underassessed property 'escaped assessment' 
and was not just 'undervalued'. 
* * * 
The specific facts of this case, when proved, 
may be determinative of whether an incorrect 
assessment, ...results in an undervaluation or 
an escaped assessment, (emphasis added) 
Id.. 799 P.2d at 1162-63. 
What the Court has distinguished in the foregoing is the 
difference in undervaluation of property and property which is 
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unassessed or underassessed. Undervaluation of property is not to 
be corrected as an escaped assessment; but property which is 
unassessed or underassessed may be so corrected. 
POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES CORRECTION OF THE 
ERROR IN ASSESSMENT. 
First Security admits that if the legislature had passed a law 
which gave it the residential exemption the law would be 
unconstitutional. Appellee's Brief, p. 21. Because the foregoing 
premise is accepted one must conclude the County's assessment was 
a de facto violation of the constitution. 
This position presents the anomalous situation that although 
the assessment violates the constitution, the Appellee contends the 
escaped property statute nonetheless bars correction of the 
unconstitutional assessment. However, under the authority of Salt 
Lake County v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah. 780 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1989), if the escaped property statute is applied to bar the 
correction of an unconstitutional assessment, such an application 
would be unconstitutional. 
Appellee further argues that Nupetco would be overruled if the 
Appellants' argument is accepted. However, Nupetco did not present 
an assessment error wherein commercial property was de facto 
classified as residential property. Further, accepting the 
County's argument does not mean that the escaped property statute 
is unconstitutional "because it limits retroactive assessment to 
just five years". Appellee's Brief, p. 21. The escaped property 
statute is constitutional on its face and in fact promotes equality 
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and uniformity if applied to correct assessment errors. But when 
an error occurs, which effectively creates a misclassification of 
property, application of the escaped property statute to bar 
correction of the classification error is unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request 
this Court reverse the decision of the Trial Court and enter 
judgment for Appellants. 
DATED this V7 day of January, 1993. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MARY ELLEN SLOAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
fsbrief.cw 
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